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Abstract 
How can we distinguish between political brokers and political entrepreneurs within political space?  Examining the role of 
individual agents, we can identify a number of definitional weaknesses in the entrepreneurship and leadership literature.  This 
leads us to consider the agency determinants of broadly defined exceptional actors.  We argue that accounts of exceptional 
agency have to incorporate information on the psychology, behaviour and relational environment of actors. However, we 
recognise that collecting complete data on agents is most often not feasible.  Since relational data strongly reflect the choices and 
behaviour actors have been making we concentrate here on the distinction between brokers and entrepreneurs in relational space.  
Within relational social science however, brokerage has been often confounded with entrepreneurship. Our aim here is to 
decouple the underlying assumptions and operationalise this distinction in Social Network Analysis (SNA). 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Agency in perspective 
This article addresses an issue intrinsic to most accounts of political agency: how to identify exceptionality. 
Going beyond the debates on structure and agency (Giddens, 1979) or those of micro-macro analysis, we tackle here 
the substantive topic of  the role of agency in bringing about policy change. In that context we first examine the 
limitations of and advances in the literature on policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers. Entrepreneurs and brokers 
have an instrumental impact on policy change (see Mintrom & Norman, 2009); but we claim it should be 
differentiated among them in policy process analysis. The aim of this paper is to develop conceptual and empirical 
guidelines to recognize their distinctive position in policy networks as well as identify the elements of that 
distinctiveness. 
Our definition of exceptionality captures the propensity of agents to act, their preferences, the institutions that 
constrain them and the networks that enable them. And since political action in advanced capitalist democracies is 
often collective, we also examine the role of belief systems within collective decision making structures. To 
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understand the actions of agents that are presumed exceptional a mere description of their decision making is not 
adequate. To comprehend these actors we have to contextualize them in their personal and professional relational 
networks. Management of their networks as a resource is vital to their success. A valid research framework should 
consider specific actions as relatively exceptional and individual actors as having the potential for exceptional 
behavior. Action and psychological predisposition need to be clearly differentiated. Furthermore an actor’s 
relational context can provide us with information about the constraints and opportunities available to them. In that 
respect exceptional political behavior is evident when certain actors transcend agency constraints that inhibit most 
other actors. After a critical examination of the social science literature we propose a synthesis of theoretical 
viewpoints that incorporate a relational perspective. Through our earlier work on exceptional agency (Christopoulos, 
2006 and forthcoming), explaining policy outputs (Ingold, 2007, 2008 and forthcoming) and brokerage 
(Christopoulos & Quaglia, 2009) we conclude that the field is undertheorised and often misspecified.   
To determine the role of exceptional agency (henceforth EA) in political action we first make a critical review of 
the literature on political entrepreneurship (henceforth PE) and brokerage in broadly defined political economy and 
political science. This leads us to a review of the constraints and opportunities for political agency with specific 
reference to the heuristic use of policy networks and the growing literature on advocacy coalitions. An assessment of 
power relations within social network analysis literature allows us to conclude that there are advantages to 
integrating formal network analysis into an explanation of the impact of political agency. Space constrains us to a 
cursory look at a number of related key issues such as the role of brokerage in EA, the impact of culture on political 
motivation, or issues related to the wider structure and agency debate (see Giddens, 1979; Bourdieu, 1977 & 1986; 
or Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). In the following section we look at past attempts to define political entrepreneurship 
(PE) and brokerage which have demonstrated a number of theoretical weaknesses. We proceed by tying a definition 
of exceptional agency with a set of suggestions for operationalising research on exceptional political actors. We 
conclude with a call for broadening the theoretical framework and sharpening of methodological tools when 
examining policy making processes. 
2. Political entrepreneurship  
Political entrepreneurship (PE) offers an intuitive interpretation of exceptional behavior but is burdened with 
conflicting and inconsistent definitions which ignore that PE would invariably be the composite outcome of a 
multitude of causes.  Furthermore, there is lack of consideration for the success of agents due to random chance or 
indeed adequate attention to the causes of failure.  To resolve some of the theoretical incongruity we consider 
political entrepreneurship as a manifestation of exceptional agency. 
The idealized portrayal of PEs is as consummate strategists (Salisbury, 1969), while often entrepreneurial actors 
are assumed to act as flexible opportunists (Kingdon, 1995).  However, opportunism could be a suboptimal 
behaviour in politics due to the nature of the electoral cycle and the reputation element of political capital. Our 
reservations with the literature are due to frequent instances where PE is employed as a character trait that 
supposedly describes the actor, but it is often better at describing the act.  PE also often confounds actors as agents 
with acts as events.   Furthermore there is an assumption that entrepreneurship is a binary state, which disregards the 
incremental and temporal nature of this behavioural concept as an actor attribute.  In other words there is a failure to 
account for the degree to which an actor is exhibiting entrepreneurial behaviour, while agent effectiveness cannot be 
assumed to be uniform in time.  
In table 1 we consider all variable categories that can be incorporated in a model of agent behaviour.  We are 
particularly concerned here with the research effort and feasibility in collecting data in each of the data categories. It 
should be apparent that although psychological predispositions are highly desirable, deploying psychometric 
evaluations of all actors in a policy environment is unfeasible (For considerations of psychological predispositions 
see Krackhardt & Kilduff (2008) and Kalish & Robins (2006)). Similarly outlining the policy preferences of each 
actor is very research intensive. On the other hand mapping-out the policy environment and collecting information 
on transactions and attempts at influence can be seen as a feasible research strategy that would partly reflect the 
preferences of agents (Weible, 2005; Ingold, 2008). 
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Table 1.  Determinants of political action 
 
 Agency Assumptions Operationalisation Research 
Resources  
Access to 
agency 
measurement 
Psychological 
predisposition 
Behavioural profile 
affects propensity for 
action 
Evaluating behavioural 
profiles of agents  
Major resources Problematic  
Preferences Political utility function 
determines the value of 
different options and 
likelihood of investing 
political capital. 
Assessing each actor’s 
policy preferences  
Moderate to 
Major resources 
Difficult to 
operationalise 
preferences 
Social networks Relational environment 
affects an actor’s ability 
to project power and 
determines the 
mechanisms of its 
curtailment through the 
power of others 
Assessing information 
transactions and 
networks of influence 
within a policy 
community 
Moderate 
resources 
Difficult to 
collect complete 
data; 
Facile to collect 
informant 
assessments 
Institutional 
space 
Institutional structure 
constrains agency 
Assessing institutional 
space 
Low to Moderate 
resources 
Relatively facile 
 
Based on a number of important contributions about policy entrepreneurship, Mintrom & Norman (2009, p. 651) 
define four key elements that characterise PE action: displaying social acuity, building teams, defining problems, 
and leading by example. The first two are strongly related to network approaches as policy entrepreneurs make good 
use of social networks – both inside and outside the jurisdictions where they seek to promote policy change. 
3. Constraints and opportunities within network structure 
While mapping institutional space belongs to the mainstream of policy studies and political science (Scott, 2001; 
Powell, 2007; Baumgardner et al., 2009) mapping of relational space is still an evolving discipline (Knoke et al., 
1996; Fenger & Klok, 2001; Henning, 2009; Christopoulos & Quaglia, 2009). The challenges of collecting network 
data can be associated with the opportunities and constraints that networks afford actors.   We should mention that 
the selection and vetting of alters entails costs, while actors have a limited network horizon (Friedkin ,1998).  
Furthermore, actors are unlikely to have the same status or resources within a policy system, while decision making 
is reserved for those endowed with decision authority and is therefore concentrated (see Stokman & van den Boos, 
1992). This as a matter of fact shows how institutional settings can be linked to network structures constraining 
actors’ behaviour or action (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Ingold & Varone, 2009). 
Social Network Analysis offers, through its insights on brokerage, a methodological adjunct to the theoretical and 
conceptual tenets of policy entrepreneurship. Furthermore, SNA provides an impressive toolbox for empirical 
analysis of social network structures and their relevance for opportunities and behavioural choices of actors in policy 
processes. Different scholars implemented a network approach in order to better reconstruct decision-making 
processes and stakeholder intervention (Knoke 1996; 1990; Krackhardt 1990; Kriesi 1980). At the same time, SNA 
allows us to demonstrate that even dense structures are rarely uniform in social systems (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994).  Actors are selective and strategic when making resource investments of their relational capital while 
information on the relationship among other actors affects their preference for tie formation and investment of the 
finite number of ties they make.  Examining a policy space poses some major challenges in integrating governance 
concepts to SNA (Christopoulos, 2008).  For one, decision making networks are qualitatively different from 
influence networks. Furthermore, conflict of competing policy ideas can not easily be mapped through network 
interaction. Typical conflict relations in policy networks are expressed by convergent and divergent ties between 
actors. Actors of interest within policy space are those that are most central or those that play brokerage roles 
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between different parts of the network. We specify below the degree to which brokerage roles are directly associated 
with entrepreneurial action. 
Overall, networks apply a filter to the information reaching actors; ameliorate risks (and potentially lead to 
impunity of higher risk taking); ameliorate shocks from the transformation of structural/institutional context; 
facilitate efficient sourcing and allocation of resources; facilitate coalition building; and shape brokerage 
opportunities for actors (Christopoulos, 2008).  Networks operate as a mediating mechanism of elite resource 
allocation and political capital distribution.  Networks can mitigate the risks undertaken from actors by cushioning-
off the impact of erroneous or unfortunate decisions.  Furthermore, network structure determines the access an actor 
can have to diverse resources. But it is not only the information and resource allocation mechanisms of networks 
that affect entrepreneurial risk-taking. Networks also allow for the dissipation of responsibility among network 
members. Those that have (or appear to have) strong ties with an actor will be sharing both costs and benefits 
relating to the risks they take.  Risk mitigation could therefore be inducing higher risk taking among networked 
actors.  
4. Brokers in policy change  
Different approaches and frameworks give policy brokers a special role when it comes to explain policy change 
and instrument choice in negotiation processes. One first and very prominent approach is the “advocacy coalition 
framework” (ACF) developed by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993). The ACF argues that policymaking entails 
policy subsystems. Each subsystem is characterised by coalitions which differ in belief systems and policy 
preferences. One can imagine that in such a process where different policy objectives are in competition and a 
multitude of stakeholders interact, a small number of specific actors can facilitate communication and ameliorate the 
different opinions present in the network. Significantly, learning across coalitions happens when respective belief 
systems and opinions about the specific policy domain differ. Conflicting belief systems of coalitions are mediated 
by policy brokers, usually state actors or scientific representatives. Their principal concern is to find some 
reasonable compromise which will reduce conflict intensity and guarantee the stability of the policy system 
(Sabatier, 1988, p.133).  
One main critique of the ACF and its broker definition is however that it neglects motivated behaviour as 
strategies and interest of actors integrated in a political decision making process (Schlager, 1995; Kübler, 2001; 
Ingold, 2008; 2009a). Sabatier (2007, p. 197) himself admits that under certain circumstances, interests (perceived 
utility) may play a crucial role. In their empirical study on offshore petroleum leasing, Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair 
(1993) conclude that interests can be as important as beliefs: they advance that for more material coalitions 
(typically motivated by economic purposes), self-interest can be a better indicator for coalitions cooperation than 
core beliefs. Weible (2005), in contrast, seems to prove that policy core beliefs are a better predictor of coordinated 
behaviour than perceptions of power. 
In the Multiple Streams framework (MS), Kingdon (1995, p. 204) defines policy entrepreneurs as much more 
strategic actors than the ACF brokers; for Kingdon, PE are creative actors motivated by the pursuit of self-serving 
benefits. The MS states that if ambiguity is pervasive and central to politics, manipulation is the effort to control 
ambiguity (Zahariadis 2007, p. 69). And typically, in situations of ambiguity, policy entrepreneurs play a crucial 
role in capturing the attention of policy makers and manipulating it to their advantage. Following the MS, they are 
more than mere advocates of particular solutions; they are power brokers and manipulators of problematic 
preferences (ibid, p. 74).  From an institutionalist point of view, both, brokers and PE are more successful in 
influencing policy change and policy outputs if they have “access to the centres of power” (ibid, p. 78). In that 
respect policy brokers and entrepreneurs have to deal with hierarchy, which differentiates them from economic 
brokers in a market system (Holcombe, 2002, p. 143).  
5. Differentiating between brokers and political entrepreneurs 
As ACF and ME, brokers are seen to play different roles in policy networks and subsequently, their impact on 
policy decision varies. One way to conceptualise the difference between these two types of exceptional actors is to 
identify each ones’ specific relational profile and intended behaviour: One of our key hypotheses is that brokers take 
bridging and/or bonding roles that appear to improve the stability of the policy environment and their position in the 
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evolving network, while entrepreneurs can be seen as more opportunistic actors interested more in policy decisions 
and outputs. Of course we recognise that although these may appear as distinct ‘ideal-types’ in reality actors rarely 
fit one or the other ideal. In a given decision making process, some entrepreneurs may for example, for strategic 
reasons, assume overt brokerage roles.  We propose below a series of operationalisation strategies that allow us to 
determine which ‘ideal-type’ between broker and entrepreneur an exceptional actor would fit best. Entrepreneurial 
success of an individual does not necessarily imply the success of their firm. Similarly the success of a political 
actor does not necessarily enhance political institutions and democracy (i.e. Berlusconi).  In table 2 we list a series 
of actor attributes that can be partially captured through network analysis.  However, it should be reiterated that in 
an ideal operationalisation environment, SNA would be but one of a number of methodological tools that should be 
utilized in capturing an agent’s volition, preferences and action.  We also recognize that the effects of action can 
only be captured through longitudinal analysis which is unfortunately beyond the resources of most research 
projects. 
Our list of network concepts distinguishes between different types of exceptional agents.  In terms of network 
cognition it should be apparent that an accurate mental map of their relational environment would provide a major 
advantage to political actors.  Our assumption is that this would be one of the distinguishing features between 
brokers and entrepreneurs.  The former would have more accurate cognition than the latter.  We assume the exact 
opposite when looking at the network horizon (Friedkin, 1998) of actors.  Our assumption here is that entrepreneurs 
would be able to have a more accurate view of alters of their own alters.  So, in terms of cognition of network 
topology, brokers would comprehend better the complete network while entrepreneurs would be able to see the 
benefits they can draw from the relations of their ties.  The former would value opportunities of flow across different 
clusters in the relational topography, while the latter benefits that can be reaped through strong ties. 
 
Table 2. Distinguishing brokers from entrepreneurs 
 
  Brokers Entrepreneurs Operationalisation 
Network Cognition + _ Accuracy of network map 
Network Horizon _ + Accuracy of network horizon 
Relational power _ + Bonacich power 
 
Pursuit of political capital _ + Political capital 
aggrandisement 
Strategic action + _ Change in centrality & 
brokerage roles  
Opportunism _ + Change  in centrality & 
brokerage roles  
 
In assessing their pursuit of power and aggrandizement of political capital we consider the Bonacich measure.  
Bonacich (1987) pays less attention to the number of ties an actor has, and more to the power of alters (for an 
application see Ingold, 2009b).  Two configurations are modelled depending on whether the tie is assumed to be one 
of influence or control.  Influence power is assumed by those connected to central and powerful alters, control 
power is assumed if an actor is connected to weak and peripheral alters.  Brokers are expected to be less apt at 
relational power than political entrepreneurs.  The same assumptions are retained for the pursuit of political capital.  
Political entrepreneurs are assumed to seek the aggrandizement of their political resources in the short term while 
brokers to seek a more strategic position, one that would afford them long term benefits.  Strategic action and 
opportunism can be examined through a longitudinal assessment of network positions.  The overarching assumption 
here is that political entrepreneurs are opportunistic, while brokers are strategic.   
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6. Policy context and future directions 
This paper is a first attempt to theoretically differentiate policy brokers from political entrepreneurs by focussing 
on their action and behaviour in policy networks. The position of such actors in policy negotiations fundamentally 
depend on the characteristics of the political system and on specific context factors. For instance, the higher the 
degree of consensus required, the more the prevalent compromise norms cultivate incentives for broker action across 
coalitions rather than for opportunistic entrepreneur intervention. This is typically the case in pluralist and 
corporatist systems, but less so in Westminster or Authoritarian systems (see Lijphart, 1999; Sabatier, 2007). It is of 
course crucial to factor-in whether a researcher analyses a subsystem exhibiting major conflict among coalitions and 
looks for brokers who mediate this conflict; or if dealing with policy innovation where the search for so-called 
policy entrepreneurs would be more relevant.  
In any case, empirical research is required to substantiate our theoretical assumptions between the two ‘ideal-
types’ of brokerage and entrepreneurial behaviour. Many questions are left pending: Can we generalise from our 
distinction between brokers and entrepreneurs in politics to the rest of the social sciences? Are such actors conscious 
of their effect on network stability? Are exceptional actors those able to reconfigure their relational environment? 
Do brokers have a wider network horizon than entrepreneurs, which benefit more from short term and opportunistic 
relations?  Do political entrepreneurs optimise their position by finding connections to powerful others or by 
dominating weak alters in a network?  Finally and most intriguingly: should we be attempting to measure brokerage 
across different types of networks?  Can in other words brokerage and entrepreneurship only be meaningfully 
examined across networks of multiplex relations? 
In this short piece we have generated more questions than we have resolved.  Our aim has been to attempt a 
meaningful and operationalisable distinction between broker and entrepreneur position and action in policy 
networks.  We have and will be putting these hypotheses to the test and hope to be able to improve on them in future 
work. 
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